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385 
Note 
 
Late for an Appointment: Balancing Impartiality 
and Accountability in the IRS Office of Appeals 
David Hahn 
And some tax collectors also came to be baptized, and they said to him, 
“Teacher, what shall we do?”1 
  INTRODUCTION   
Larry Tucker didn’t pay his taxes for three years.2 The In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a lien on his property. Tucker 
objected, offering instead to pay off his liabilities in a compro-
mise settlement, but the IRS representative refused.3 Frustrated 
with the adverse result, Tucker attacked the system that 
brought it about, claiming that the method of choosing that rep-
resentative was unconstitutional.4 The implications of his claim 
reach far beyond IRS human resources policy: Can an adjudica-
tor in any agency be both “impartial”5 and “politically accounta-
ble”?6 And what role does the agency’s structure play in answer-
ing that question? 
Taxpayers in Tucker’s situation can challenge an IRS collec-
tion action by requesting a collection due process (CDP) hearing 
 
   J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grate-
ful to Professor Kristin Hickman for helping me develop this topic and offering 
guidance along the way; to Professor Christopher Roberts for serving as my ad-
visor and providing useful feedback; to Trevor Matthews and Franklin Guenth-
ner for their thorough and thoughtful comments throughout many drafts; and 
to the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard editorial 
work. Most importantly, thank you to Amy Lohmann and to my parents, Mar-
garet and Victor Hahn, for their unwavering support. Copyright © 2018 by Da-
vid Hahn. 
 1. Luke 3:12–13. 
 2. Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 117–18 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 116–17. 
 5. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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before an “impartial officer” or employee of the IRS Office of Ap-
peals.7 The purpose of the hearing is to resolve tax disputes be-
fore litigation and to balance efficient tax collection with the 
rights of the taxpayer.8 Taxpayers may appeal an adverse CDP 
determination to the U.S. Tax Court.9 For the last twenty years, 
CDP hearings have played a central role in the tax collection pro-
cess.10 
CDP officers wield substantial government power. They 
have wide discretion in determining the appropriateness of col-
lection actions, and they have the power to bind the govern-
ment.11 And these hearings are not rare; the IRS Office of Ap-
peals received 43,749 CDP cases in Fiscal Year 2016 and 
resolved 41,380 in the same period.12 When a taxpayer submits 
an offer-in-compromise, the CDP officer is the face of the agency, 
and when that offer is successful, the hearing is the whole of the 
taxpayer’s adversarial interaction with the IRS.13  
CDP officers are not meant to be political agents of the IRS. 
On the contrary, they have a statutory duty to be “impartial.”14 
They are not writing regulations or creating policy; they merely 
apply existing policy to decide the appropriateness of an individ-
ual collection action.15 Like other members of the federal civil 
service, CDP officers enjoy protection against political retalia-
tion and can contest adverse employment actions before the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, meaning—effectively—that 
they are only removable for good cause.16 
This combination of power and protection places CDP offic-
ers in a constitutional conundrum. The Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution imposes procedural constraints on the appoint-
ment of all “Officers of the United States.”17 The President, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, must appoint all “principal 
 
 7. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017). 
 8. Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C). 
 9. Id. § 6330(d)(1). 
 10. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE IRS COLLECTION PROCESS: PUBLICA-
TION 594, at 4 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf [hereinafter IRS 
COLLECTION PROCESS] (describing the role of the CDP hearing). 
 11. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 12. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2016 DATA BOOK 50 (2017), https://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. 
 13. See infra note 64. 
 14. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3). 
 15. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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officers,” but Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior of-
ficers” in “the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or the Heads 
of Departments.”18 By giving Congress the power to create of-
fices, but the executive and judicial branches the power to fill 
them, the Clause promotes the separation of powers.19 It adds 
transparency to the appointment process, ensuring that govern-
ment officers are accountable to the politicians that appoint 
them and, by extension, to the public.20 Courts and commenta-
tors have struggled to define an “Officer of the United States” 
and what differentiates “inferior officers” from “principal offic-
ers,” but there is consensus that these terms have a broad 
sweep.21 A recent surge of separation-of-powers litigation has 
seen many litigants arguing that government officials are uncon-
stitutionally appointed.22 
But appointments are only half of the equation. The Su-
preme Court has struck down restrictions on officer removal 
when those restrictions severely limit the President’s ability to 
oversee the execution of the laws.23 If the Appointments Clause 
is meant to provide political accountability, the Court reasoned, 
then there must be a way to hold officers accountable, and the 
most obvious way is removal.24 If CDP officers are Officers of the 
United States, then they must be appointed consistent with the 
Appointments Clause.25 But if the limitations on their removal 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 20. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997). 
 21. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the definition of “inferior of-
ficer” as “unusually broad”); Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Ap-
pointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007) (describing an “inferior officer” 
as anyone who holds a position that is “continuing” and “invested by legal au-
thority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government”); 
James Heilpern, Ode to the Assistant Doorkeeper of the House of Representatives, 
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/ 
ode-to-the-assistant-doorkeeper-of-the-house-of-representatives-by-james 
-heilpern (noting that an eighteenth-century assistant doorkeeper to the House 
of Representatives was called an officer). 
 22. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Burgess v. FDIC, 871 
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (challenging the appointment of SEC admin-
istrative law judges); Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 23. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (holding that two layers of “good 
cause” removal protection for Board members is unconstitutional). 
 24. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664 (“The power to remove . . . is a powerful 
tool for control.”). 
 25. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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improperly insulate them from political accountability, they may 
no longer be able to enjoy civil service protections. 
Litigants have argued that CDP officers are unconstitution-
ally appointed. The U.S. Tax Court rejected such a challenge in 
2010, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.26 Both opinions rested on 
reasoning that has since been called into question, and neither 
addressed CDP officers’ civil service protections. Several cases 
currently pending before the U.S. Tax Court could allow more 
circuits to consider the issue soon.27 
There is reason to believe that new cases will yield different 
results. There is growing scholarly and judicial support for a for-
malistic and wide-ranging definition of “Officer of the United 
States”28—one that could encompass both administrative law 
judges (ALJs)29 and informal agency adjudicators.30 The Su-
preme Court has been open to examining these questions.31 Even 
so, if current appointments are unconstitutional, there is consid-
erable disagreement over the appropriate solution.32 
 
 26. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 114. 
 27. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 1, Thompson v. 
Comm’r, No. 7038-15L (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not 
subject to the Appointments Clause); Petitioner’s Motion to Remand at 1, Elmes 
v. Comm’r, No. 24872-14L (T.C. Sept. 30, 2017) (arguing that CDP officers are 
subject to the appointments clause); Order at 1, Fonticiella v. Comm’r, No. 
23776-15L (T.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying petitioner’s motion for recusal on 
grounds that the President’s authority to remove Tax Court judges does not vi-
olate separation of powers principles). 
 28. See generally John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Uncon-
stitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY O-PAT. L.J. 21, 21 (2007); Jennifer Mascott, Who 
Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 454 (2018) (arguing 
that the original public meaning of “Officer of the United States” is “one whom 
the government entrusts to perform a statutory duty of any level of im-
portance”). 
 29. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018) (holding that ALJs 
in the SEC are officers); see also Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 898 F.3d 
669, 679 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 30. See, e.g., Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying 
Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 
MO. L. REV. 1143 (2011) (arguing that CDP officers must be constitutionally 
appointed). 
 31. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54 (considering whether ALJs are offic-
ers). 
 32. See id. at 2055 (remanding case for a new hearing before a different 
ALJ); id. at 2064 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that remand-
ing for a new hearing before the same ALJ poses no Appointments Clause or 
Due Process violation). Compare Thomas C. Rossidis, Article II Complications 
Surrounding SEC-Employed Administrative Law Judges, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
773, 777–78 (2016) (advocating reappointment of ALJs by SEC Commissioners, 
protection of past rulings under a “de facto officer” doctrine, and continued dual-
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The combination of a broad officer definition and close scru-
tiny of removal restrictions could leave any government agency 
that employs career civil servants vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge. This trend could undermine both formal and informal 
agency adjudication, affecting the way agencies structure their 
adjudicatory procedures, who is chosen for adjudicative roles, 
and to whom those adjudicators are accountable. This dilemma 
highlights a tension between formalist and functionalist consti-
tutional interpretation: How should the strict construction of 
constitutional text interact with pragmatic historical practice 
when deciding these questions?33 
This Note straddles the line between formalism and func-
tionalism. It first observes that—for better or worse—CDP offic-
ers are likely Officers of the United States and therefore require 
constitutional appointment. CDP officers exercise substantial 
discretion while carrying out statutorily-mandated duties that 
play a crucial role in the tax collection process.34 Because of the 
supervision they face from the Agency, they are likely inferior—
rather than principal—officers. The previous cases that ad-
dressed the issue were wrongly decided, and even if they were 
correct at the time, recent Appointments Clause litigation calls 
their reasoning into question.35  
This Note also addresses an issue previous courts and com-
mentators have not considered: whether CDP officers’ civil ser-
vice protections are unconstitutional restrictions on their re-
moval. It concludes that those protections are not only 
constitutional under current Supreme Court precedent but are 
also a normative good, preserving the impartiality that Congress 
contemplated.36 While this Note focuses on CDP officers, it rec-
 
layer good-cause removal protections), with Memorandum from Professor Ste-
ven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji to the Senate & the House of Representatives 
1 (Nov. 7, 2017) (advocating the abolition of 158 ALJ positions and the addition 
by legislation of circuit court judgeships). 
 33. Compare NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (Breyer, 
J.) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of government’ . . . can inform our determina-
tion of ‘what the law is.’” (first quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 
(1819); and then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803))), with id. 
at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[P]ast practice does not, by 
itself, create power.” (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008))). 
 34. See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 36. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that officers conducting CDP 
hearings be impartial). 
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ognizes the implications these questions have for informal adju-
dicators throughout the administrative state.37 
Part I discusses the statutory and regulatory scheme under-
lying CDP hearings and traces the history and purposes of the 
Appointments Clause, highlighting key doctrinal developments 
in the last ten years. Part II analyzes how courts disposed of ear-
lier Appointments Clause challenges to the CDP process, ex-
plains how recent litigation casts those decisions into doubt, and 
concludes that CDP officers are likely inferior officers. Part III 
recommends that Congress provide for the appointment of CDP 
officers by the Secretary of the Treasury to promote prospective 
accountability for the quality of CDP decisions but concludes 
that CDP officers’ civil service protections are constitutional be-
cause of their adjudicative role. 
I.  THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND CDP HEARINGS   
The IRS Office of Appeals has, for years, provided taxpayers 
a venue to appeal adverse decisions internally before taking dis-
putes to court.38 For most of the twentieth century, the IRS en-
joyed considerable discretion in how to structure those appeals.39 
In response to rising concerns for taxpayer due process rights,40 
Congress passed the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
(RRA), establishing the CDP process and requiring the Agency 
to follow certain procedures in its execution.41 Section A dis-
cusses the power and prominence of CDP officers under that leg-
islation. 
Whether those statutory changes transformed CDP officers 
from mere IRS employees to Officers of the United States re-
quires a precise understanding of both the power they exercise 
 
 37. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 549–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (compiling an appendix of twenty-four de-
partments and 573 career-appointed positions arguably occupied by Officers of 
the United States who are subject to two layers of for-cause removal protec-
tions). 
 38. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HISTORY OF APPEALS, 60TH ANNIVER-
SARY EDITION 3–6 (1987). 
 39. Andrew Strelka & Sean Morrison, The IRS and America’s Longest Run-
ning ADR Program, 63 FED. LAW. 28, 28 (2016) (citing INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., HISTORY OF APPEALS, 60TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (1987)) (describing 
the series of appeals schemes the IRS created by regulation before procedures 
were mandated by statute). 
 40. See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998) (“The Committee believes that 
following procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in collections will 
increase fairness to taxpayers.”). 
 41. See I.R.C. § 6330. 
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and how courts have applied the Appointments Clause to date. 
To lay this foundation, Section B discusses the history of the Ap-
pointments Clause, articulations of its broad sweep, and how re-
cent courts have applied it to administrative adjudicators. 
A. THE IRS OFFICE OF APPEALS AND COLLECTION DUE PROCESS 
HEARINGS 
CDP hearings have become a fixture of the tax collection 
process.42 A brief summary of that process helps illustrate their 
significance. 
1. Tax Collection Generally 
Uncontested tax collection follows a fairly simple process. 
First, the IRS makes an assessment to establish the amount 
owed, commonly through the filing of a federal tax return.43 
When the amount already paid exceeds the amount owed, the 
IRS issues a refund. When the taxpayer owes additional taxes, 
the IRS issues a bill for the unpaid amount.44 
Complexities arise if the taxpayer does not pay. If the tax 
remains unpaid ten days after the taxpayer receives notice of an 
assessment and a demand for payment, a federal tax lien at-
taches to the taxpayer’s property.45 The IRS provides a Notice of 
Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) to the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s 
other creditors, establishing the priority of the IRS’s claim.46 The 
NFTL may negatively impact the taxpayer’s credit score.47 
If a taxpayer still does not pay after a lien attaches, the IRS 
may levy the taxpayer’s property.48 A federal tax lien establishes 
a legal claim to the taxpayer’s property, but a levy involves an 
actual seizure of the property. This can involve a physical seizure 
 
 42. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 137–39 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the role of the CDP hearing). 
 43. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 
6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 55 (2004). The tax lien 
arises automatically after nonpayment of the first tax bill and applies to all of 
the taxpayer’s current and future property, including “a house or car, and rights 
to property, such as wages and bank accounts.” IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, su-
pra note 10, at 4–5. 
 46. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 5. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cords, supra note 45. 
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(e.g., of a house or a car) or a seizure of rights to property (e.g., 
garnishment of wages or Social Security payments).49 
2. The Collection Due Process Hearing 
The tools of tax collection give the IRS substantial power.50 
Over the years, both Congress and the Agency have created pro-
cedures to protect taxpayers from the arbitrary exercise of that 
power. The RRA created the CDP hearing to balance efficient tax 
collection with the “legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the 
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”51 
Within five days after a federal tax lien arises, the IRS must 
send the taxpayer a notice of: (1) the amount of unpaid tax; (2) 
the right to request a CDP hearing within 30 days; and (3) the 
proposed collection action.52 A taxpayer that returns a written 
request53 is entitled to a CDP hearing before an “impartial of-
ficer,” which the statute defines as an “officer or employee who 
has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax.”54 
No statutory provision expressly creates either the Office of Ap-
peals or CDP officers. Regulations allow the hearings to be con-
ducted by (1) Appeals Team Managers; (2) Settlement Officers; 
or (3) Appeals Account Resolution Specialists.55 For simplicity’s 
sake and because the statutory duties are the same, this Note 
refers to these positions collectively as “CDP officers.” In the ab-
sence of an organic provision specifically creating CDP officers, 
the IRS staffs the Office of Appeals through its generic hiring 
 
 49. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 5. If a taxpayer remains 
“seriously delinquent” on his or her debt, there may be additional consequences, 
including a legal summons to meet with the IRS or passport revocation. Id. 
 50. Commentators have noted that these tools give the IRS substantially 
more power to collect than a private creditor enjoys. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The 
Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2004). 
 51. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 68 (1998). 
 52. I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3) (2017). The notice typically must precede the collec-
tion action, but the IRS has promulgated regulations allowing for post-levy  
notice where the tax collection is in jeopardy or involves a state tax refund. Id. 
§ 6330(a)(1)–(2); see Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6330-1(a)(2)(i)–(ii) (2018). 
 53. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(c)(2). 
 54. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3). Elsewhere in the RRA, Congress required that the 
IRS implement a reorganization plan that includes a prohibition on ex parte 
communications between Appeals Officers and other IRS staff “to the extent 
that such communications appear to compromise the independence of the ap-
peals officers.” Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a)(4) (1998). 
 55. IRM 8.22.4.5 (Aug. 9, 2017). 
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provision.56 The Tax Court noted in dicta that if the Appoint-
ments Clause does apply to CDP officers, the current hiring pro-
cedures do not amount to a constitutional appointment.57 
At the hearing, the CDP officer must first verify that the IRS 
has abided by applicable law and administrative procedures.58 
The taxpayer may then raise “any relevant issue relating to the 
unpaid tax . . . including (i) appropriate spousal defenses; (ii) 
challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions; and (iii) 
offers of collection alternatives.”59 The taxpayer can challenge 
the underlying liability if not previously afforded an opportunity 
to do so.60 After considering the IRS’s compliance with proce-
dural requirements, the issues raised by the taxpayer, and 
“whether any proposed collection action balances the need for 
the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the 
person that any collection action be no more intrusive than nec-
essary,” the officer issues a determination.61 
CDP officers’ decision-making is subject to several forms of 
supervision, but they retain significant discretion. For example, 
the Internal Revenue Manual instructs CDP officers to request 
legal advice from the Associate Chief Counsel on “novel or sig-
nificant” legal issues.62 When the CDP officer determines that 
there is a “lack of uniformity . . . on the disposition of [an] issue,” 
she must obtain a Technical Advice Memorandum from the Of-
fice of the Chief Counsel.63 When the technical advice is favora-
ble to the taxpayer, the CDP officer must follow it, but the officer 
retains the discretion to settle cases notwithstanding non-favor-
able technical advice.64 
 
 56. See I.R.C. § 7804(a) (authorizing the Commissioner “to employ such 
number of persons as the Commissioner deems proper for the administration 
and enforcement of the internal revenue laws”). 
 57. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 126 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the IRS’s hiring procedures do not conform to the 
Appointments Clause). 
 58. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1). 
 59. Id. § 6330(c)(2). 
 60. Hoffman v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 140, 145 (2002). 
 61. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3). 
 62. IRM 8.6.3.4 (Oct. 6, 2016). 
 63. The Internal Revenue Manual leaves the determination of the appro-
priateness of seeking such a memorandum to the discretion of the CDP officer. 
IRM 8.6.3.2.3 (Oct. 6, 2016) (“Appeals determines whether to request a 
TAM . . . .”). 
 64. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f ) (9)(viii)(c) (2018); see also IRM 8.6.3.3.2 (Oct. 6, 
2016). IRS regulations also impose guidelines concerning when officers may ac-
cept an offer from a taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f ) (2). CDP officers refer a 
taxpayer’s offer-in-compromise to the “centralized offer-in-compromise” (COIC) 
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The taxpayer (but not the IRS) may appeal the CDP officer’s 
determination to the Tax Court.65 The Tax Court reviews the 
CDP determination for abuse of discretion unless the underlying 
tax liability is at issue, in which case the Tax Court reviews the 
determination de novo.66 The Office of Appeals retains jurisdic-
tion to conduct future hearings with respect to its determina-
tions.67 
As federal employees, CDP officers enjoy significant civil 
service protections. The purpose of the civil service is to ensure 
that hiring and promotion decisions are based on merit and to 
protect career federal workers from political pressure and retal-
iation.68 As non-senior employees in a cabinet-level agency, CDP 
officers are part of the competitive service.69 Competitive service 
employees may appeal certain adverse employment actions—in-
cluding removal—to the Merit Systems Protections Board 
(MSPB) for a determination of whether good cause existed.70 The 
members of the MSPB are appointed by the President and are 
themselves removable only for cause.71 The result is that CDP 
 
unit for processing. If the COIC unit rejects the offer, the CDP officer still makes 
a final determination. IRM 8.22.7.10.4.5 (Aug. 9, 2017). When the amount of 
compromised, unpaid tax exceeds $50,000, the officer must obtain a favorable 
opinion from the IRS General Counsel. I.R.C. § 7122(b). When relieving a tax-
payer of liability through a closing agreement, the officer must obtain the Sec-
retary’s approval. Id. § 7121(b). 
 65. Id. § 6330(d)(1). 
 66. Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 609–10 (2000). 
 67. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(3). A taxpayer who does not timely request a CDP hear-
ing may still request an equivalent hearing. Equivalent hearings are prescribed 
entirely by regulation rather than by statute, but their procedures closely mir-
ror CDP hearings, and taxpayers may raise all the same issues. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 6330-1(i)(1); LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 13C:11 n.70–74 
and accompanying text (4th ed. 2018). But unlike in CDP hearings, equivalent 
hearings do not require the IRS to halt collection actions, and decisions result-
ing from equivalent hearings are not appealable to the Tax Court. Treas. Reg. 
§ 6330-1(i)(2), A-16. 
 68. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(8) (2017) (“Employees should be . . . protected 
against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political 
purposes.”). 
 69. See id. § 2102(a) (defining competitive service to include all positions 
not specifically excepted, requiring Senate confirmation, or in the Senior Exec-
utive Service). 
 70. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1) (2018). Employees in “excepted” positions do not 
have these rights. See Excepting Administrative Law Judges from Competitive 
Service, Exec. Order No. 13,843, 88 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-excepting 
-administrative-law-judges-competitive-service (purporting to except adminis-
trative law judges, thereby depriving them of civil service protections). 
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). 
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officers, in effect, enjoy two layers of good-cause protection from 
removal: their own civil service protections combined with those 
of the MSPB. These protections constitute a multi-layered stat-
utory and regulatory framework, a contrast to the discrete for-
cause removal provisions of other statutes.72 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
The Appointments Clause requires that all “officers of the 
United States” be appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, but it allows Congress to vest the ap-
pointment of “inferior officers” in the President alone, the 
“Courts of Law,” or the “Heads of Departments.”73 The Clause 
does not define “officer” or “inferior officer,” and disputes over its 
applicability center around these terms. 
Traditionally, the removal power is incident to the execu-
tive’s appointment power.74 Statutory schemes that go too far in 
inhibiting that power unconstitutionally intrude on the Presi-
dent’s obligation to execute the laws.75 A complete picture of an 
officer’s appointment, therefore, requires accounting for removal 
from office. 
This Section provides a brief history of the Appointments 
Clause and the removal power. It outlines the Clause’s intended 
purpose, describes its contemporary interpretations, and ex-
plores the difficulty courts have had in applying it to formal and 
informal administrative adjudicators. 
1. Origins and Purpose 
The Appointments Clause has its roots in complaints about 
pre-Revolutionary British colonial administration.76 The king 
would create offices in the colonies and hand-pick the people to 
fill them; colonists saw many of these offices as simply a waste 
 
 72. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2017) (“The President may remove the 
Director [of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] for inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, or malfeasance in office.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (severing for-cause removal 
provisions). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 74. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509. 
 75. See id. at 492 (holding that two layers of for-cause removal protection 
for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violated the 
separation of powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 76. Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1147. 
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of their resources.77 To alleviate this problem, the Founders im-
posed limitations on the installation of individuals that wield 
government power.78 The Clause separates the legislative power 
to create offices from the executive power to fill them.79 
Cabining the appointment and removal powers in a limited 
and identifiable group of individuals promotes transparency and 
political accountability. Citizens unhappy with the performance 
of government workers know who to blame and can remedy those 
grievances through the democratic process.80 The appointing of-
ficial will—at least in theory—anticipate this accountability and 
ensure that the individual being appointed is qualified and ca-
pable of doing the job.81 Citizens unhappy with an officer can ex-
ert political pressure on the appointer to remove the appointee 
from office. 
2. Who Is an “Officer of the United States”? 
Most disputes involving the Appointments Clause involve 
the distinction between officers and mere employees of the fed-
eral government.82 Typically, an “officer” for purposes of the Ap-
pointments Clause is a means through which the President exe-
cutes the law.83 An officer therefore wields some form of federal 
power, often executive.84 
Early cases addressing the distinction offer little clarity. In 
1867, for example, the Supreme Court held that “tenure, dura-
tion, emolument, and duties” characterize an office.85 In another 
 
 77. Id. at 1147–48. 
 78. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 663 (1997); Officers of 
the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 75 
(2007). 
 79. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659; see also Officers of the U.S. Within the Mean-
ing of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 75 (2007); Lindstedt, supra 
note 30, at 1147. 
 80. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018); Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 83. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 79 (2007) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 
(1997)) (relating the Appointments Clause to the requirement that the Presi-
dent “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 3)). 
 84. Id. at 76–79 (describing the delegation of a portion of the sovereign pow-
ers of the federal government as an essential element of an office). 
 85. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867). 
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case, the Court held that any individual “who can be said to hold 
an office” must be constitutionally appointed.86 These decisions 
offer no clear standard, but they suggest the term officer covers 
a wide range of government workers. Following these early 
cases, the Appointments Clause received relatively little atten-
tion until 1976.  
The Supreme Court articulated the modern officer standard 
in Buckley v. Valeo: “[A]ny appointee exercising significant au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of 
the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the 
manner prescribed by [the Appointments Clause].”87 Applying 
this test to the Federal Election Commission, the Court identi-
fied three categories in the Commission’s duties: informative, 
rulemaking, and adjudicative/enforcement.88 The Court held 
that, while the Commission’s informative duties—i.e., investiga-
tive and reporting tasks—were not significant, its rulemaking 
and adjudicatory functions were.89 Buckley’s standard has been 
the basis of Appointments Clause analyses ever since, but a clear 
definition of significant authority has proved elusive.90 
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Court applied the Appoint-
ments Clause to special trial judges (STJs) in the U.S. Tax 
Court.91 The Internal Revenue Code allows the Chief Tax Judge 
to assign STJs to hear enumerated categories of cases as well as 
“any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.”92 
STJs can enter final judgments in the enumerated categories, 
but can only offer recommended resolutions in the other cases 
assigned by the Chief Judge.93 The Court noted that the office of 
STJ is “‘established by Law’ . . . and the duties, salary, and 
means of appointment . . . are specified by statute.”94 STJs “take 
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, 
 
 86. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878). 
 87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 137. 
 89. Id. at 126. 
 90. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991); Bandimere v. SEC, 
844 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018); Ray-
mond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Tucker v. 
Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 91. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870. 
 92. I.R.C. § 7443A(a)–(b) (2017). 
 93. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 876–77 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II). 
 94. Id. at 881. 
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and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery or-
ders.”95 All of this added up to the significant authority required 
for officer status.96 Moreover, the fact that STJs perform some 
less significant tasks was beside the point: just because “an infe-
rior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed 
by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not 
transform his status under the Constitution.”97 Nearly identical 
characteristics led the Court to hold in Lucia v. SEC that ALJs 
in the Securities and Exchange Commission are officers.98 
The Supreme Court sidestepped an opportunity to clarify its 
significant authority standard in Lucia.99 And while lower courts 
and commentators have proposed a range of frameworks,100 of-
ficer status seems ultimately to depend on a collection of factors, 
including but not necessarily limited to: (1) whether the office at 
issue is “established by law;”101 (2) whether its “duties, salary, 
and means of appointment . . . are specified by statute;”102 (3) 
whether the alleged officer’s decisions are final;103 (4) whether 
the office is subject to formal procedures in its proceedings;104 (5) 
whether the alleged officer exercises “significant discretion;”105 
(6) whether the position is “continuing;”106 and (7) whether the 
 
 95. Id. at 881–82. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 882. 
 98. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See also Lindstedt, supra note 30; Mascott, supra note 28. Compare 
Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding “that final deci-
sion-making authority is not a necessary condition for Officer status” and high-
lighting other relevant criteria), and Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 
(10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (concluding that the three 
characteristics from Freytag were the proper framework), with Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “the ability to make final, 
binding decisions on behalf of the Government” is a requisite component), and 
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (highlighting both “the 
authority to render the final decision” and the ability to make one’s own factual 
findings as important tests). 
 101. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179. 
 102. Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881). 
 103. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133; see also Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 104. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
 105. Id. at 882. 
 106. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
539–40 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Officers of the U.S. Within the 
Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007)). 
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office is “invested by legal authority with a portion of the sover-
eign powers of the federal government.”107 There is considerable 
disagreement over what these factors mean, how to properly 
weigh them, and which of them are required for officer status.108 
The result is a notion of officer that is both vague and ex-
ceedingly broad, potentially reaching roles in nearly all corners 
of the federal government.109 One court illustrated the breadth 
of the term by simply listing some of the roles held to fall in the 
category: 
 a district court clerk; 
 an “assistant-surgeon;” 
 “thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, In-
terior, and the othe[r]” departments; 
 an election supervisor; 
 a federal marshal; 
 a “cadet engineer” appointed by the Secretary of the Navy; 
 a “commissioner of the circuit court;” 
 a vice consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul; 
 extradition commissioners; 
 a U.S. commissioner in district court proceedings; 
 a postmaster first class; 
 Federal Election Commission (FEC) commissioners; 
 an independent counsel; 
 Tax Court special trial judges; and 
 military judges.110 
For this reason, and because of the lack of clear guidance from 
the Supreme Court, deciding whether an individual is an officer 
frequently comes down to comparing the duties of the office at 
issue with those previously designated officers.111 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See also Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007) (describing an “inferior officer” as anyone 
who holds a position that is “continuing” and “invested by legal authority with 
a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government”). Compare Landry, 
204 F.3d at 1125 (holding that the FDIC’s ALJs are not inferior officers because 
they lack final decision-making authority), with Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 
302 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that an inferior officer must exercise “signifi-
can[t] . . . duties and discretion” and that final decision-making authority is not 
dispositive of the question). 
 109. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see 
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2065 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
vast majority of those who work for the Federal Government are not ‘Officers of 
the United States.’”). 
 110. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. de-
nied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). 
 111. See, e.g., Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047–48 (noting the many characteristics 
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3. Principal Versus Inferior Officers 
The Appointments Clause applies to all “Officers of the 
United States,” but it prescribes different requirements depend-
ing on whether the officer is “principal” or “inferior.”112 Whereas 
the test for defining an officer focuses on the individual’s duties 
and authority, principal or inferior status depends on the of-
ficer’s relationship to other government officials. 
Edmond v. United States is the leading modern case on the 
principal-inferior distinction.113 In that case, the Court held that 
military judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals 
are inferior officers.114 An inferior officer, according to the Court, 
is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by 
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.”115 The word inferior, then, 
does not indicate that the officer’s authority is necessarily less 
significant than a principal officer’s; it just means that that au-
thority is subject to supervision. 
The Coast Guard judges in Edmond faced substantial super-
vision from both the Judge Advocate General and the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces.116 They were required to comply 
with procedural rules made by other Executive Branch officials 
and faced automatic review by the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces in certain categories of cases.117 The upshot, ac-
cording to the Court, is that the judges “ha[d] no power to render 
a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted 
to do so by other Executive officers.”118 Courts have relied on the 
Edmond subordination test ever since.119 
 
ALJs share with the STJs in Freytag). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 113. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
 114. Id. at 665. 
 115. Id. at 663; see also id. at 662 (“Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer de-
pends on whether he has a superior.”). 
 116. Id. at 664. 
 117. Id. at 664–65. 
 118. Id. at 665. 
 119. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 
U.S. 477, 510 (2010); Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 
36 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 
684 F.3d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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4. Who Can Appoint? 
The Appointments Clause provides a default rule: the Pres-
ident must appoint “Officers of the United States” with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.120 Even if an officer is inferior, 
that default rule applies unless Congress provides for appoint-
ment by the President alone, a “Head of Department,” or a 
“Court of Law.” Both terms have inspired judicial debate, and 
while a full exploration of that debate is beyond the scope of this 
Note, a brief summary is necessary. 
The meaning of “Court of Law” for Appointments Clause 
purposes is far from certain. The Freytag Court, while unani-
mous as to the inferior officer status of STJs and even as to the 
constitutionality of their appointment, split five to four on the 
reasoning.121 The majority concluded that the U.S. Tax Court is 
a Court of Law.122 It reasoned that, even though the Tax Court 
was not created under Article III, it exercises the “judicial power 
of the United States” and performs “exclusively judicial func-
tions.”123 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, disagreed 
sharply; in his view, only Article III courts could exercise the ju-
dicial power of the United States.124 Because the Founders would 
not have conceived of courts outside the context of Article III, he 
reasoned, only Article III courts could be Courts of Law for pur-
poses of the Appointments Clause.125 The D.C. Circuit later held 
that the Tax Court is a Court of Law for the Appointments 
Clause but does not exercise “the judicial power of the United 
States.”126 Because the Court endorsed Justice Scalia’s Freytag 
concurrence on other grounds in a later case, there is a real pos-
sibility that Courts of Law are limited to Article III.127 
Justice Scalia would have held that the Tax Court is a “de-
partment,” with the Chief Tax Judge as its “head.”128 While the 
 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 121. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 122. Id. at 891–92. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 908–09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). 
 125. Id. at 903. 
 126. Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 940–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 127. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 510–11 (2010). 
 128. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 914 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
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majority had concluded that a Department must be “like a Cab-
inet-level department,”129 Justice Scalia concluded that a depart-
ment must merely be a “separate organization” within the Exec-
utive Branch with independent organization.130 A Head of 
Department must be appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.131 
Under either approach in Freytag, the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue is likely not a Head of Department. If a Depart-
ment must be a cabinet-level agency, this is clear; despite its size 
and significance, the IRS is not a cabinet department. And under 
Justice Scalia’s independent organization approach, the result is 
the same; because the IRS is a subordinate agency in the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, it is likely not a separate organization or 
allotment. The Tax Court has assumed this result in dicta.132 
The Head of Department for IRS workers, therefore, is likely the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
5. The Removal Power 
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court announced, 
as a general rule, that the President has an unrestricted power 
to remove executive officers.133 That removal power flows from 
the right to appoint the officer.134 Because a purpose of the Ap-
pointments Clause is to ensure political accountability for an of-
ficer’s performance, it follows that the appointer must have some 
degree of control over the appointee; removal is the most basic 
and powerful mechanism of exercising that control.135 
But in some cases, an officer’s role justifies a greater degree 
of independence from the President. In such cases, the Court has 
upheld removal restrictions. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States, the Court held that Congress could restrict the removal 
of principal officers in the Federal Trade Commission to cases of 
 
 129. Id. at 915. 
 130. Id. at 920 (citing 1 N. Webster, AMERICAN DICTIONARY 58 (1828)); see 
also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 511 (describing a “Department” as a “free-
standing component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained 
within any other such component”). 
 131. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919. 
 132. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 125–26 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 133. 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
 134. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
509 (2010) (The Constitution does not enumerate a removal power). 
 135. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”136 The 
Court justified its holding by noting that, while the function of 
the officer in Myers was “purely executive,” Federal Trade Com-
missioners played a “quasi[-]legislative” and “quasi[-]judicial” 
role, which made a degree of independence desirable.137 
While the Federal Trade Commissioner in Humphrey’s Ex-
ecutor was a principal officer, the Court has also upheld re-
strictions on the removal of inferior officers.138 In Morrison v. Ol-
son, the Court held that the Ethics and Government Act did not 
violate the separation of powers by imposing a “good cause” re-
moval protection designed to ensure the impartiality of inde-
pendent counsels.139 Although the President lacked the power to 
remove the independent counsel and the Attorney General could 
only do so for good cause, the Court upheld the statute.140 
Congress’s power to impose restrictions on removal is not 
boundless, however. Before 2010, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act pro-
vided that members of the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB), an independent agency, could only be re-
moved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
good cause.141 The statute defined good cause and gave PCAOB 
members the right to “notice and opportunity for a hearing” be-
fore removal.142 A removal order was subject to judicial re-
view.143 In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over-
sight Board, the Court struck down these provisions.144 The 
Court assumed, without deciding, that members of the SEC are 
 
 136. 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935). 
 137. Id. at 627–29. 
 138. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (upholding re-
strictions on the removal of a naval cadet-engineer). 
 139. 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). 
 140. Id. Many have speculated that Morrison’s viability is in doubt in light 
of changes to the Court’s composition. See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. 
Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998); Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, 
LAWFARE (June 9, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v 
-olson-bad-law. As of publication, Morrison has not been overruled, and the 
Court cited it in Free Enterprise Fund as precedent for placing restrictions on 
the removal of inferior officers. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 494–95. 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2009). 
 142. Id. § 7217(d)(3). 
 143. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 556(a), 557(a), 557(c)(B) (2009); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78y(a)(1). 
 144. 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010). 
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subject to the for-cause removal protections outlined in Humph-
rey’s Executor,145 which gave PCAOB members two levels of 
good-cause protection. The Court held these restrictions uncon-
stitutional, and it severed the good-cause provisions from the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146 The Court then used this holding to up-
hold the constitutionality of the appointment of PCAOB mem-
bers more generally; without providing much explanation, the 
Court noted that, because PCAOB members were now subject to 
at-will removal by the SEC, they were inferior—rather than 
principal—officers.147 
The Free Enterprise Fund opinion created a great deal of un-
certainty. While the majority emphasized the unusual nature of 
PCAOB’s appointment and removal scheme, there is reason to 
believe that hundreds or thousands of other federal officials 
could be characterized as having two layers of good-cause re-
moval protection.148 Perhaps most significantly, the broadest 
reading of Free Enterprise Fund casts doubt on the constitution-
ality of any officer who is a member of the civil service.149 And in 
contrast to the neatly severable provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, civil service protections 
come from a complex statutory and regulatory framework, ren-
dering the majority’s severance remedy unworkable. 
The majority in Free Enterprise Fund explicitly noted that 
the opinion does not address the status of ALJs.150 It justified its 
holding on the grounds that PCAOB members exercised enforce-
ment and policymaking—rather than adjudicative—func-
tions.151 Adjudicators are thus impliedly permitted to enjoy 
greater restrictions on their removal. Reading between these 
lines suggests that Free Enterprise Fund merely requires courts 
 
 145. Id. at 487 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot them-
selves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey’s Execu-
tor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935))). 
 146. Id. at 508. 
 147. Id. at 510 (“Given that the Commission is properly viewed . . . as pos-
sessing the power to remove Board members at will, . . . the Board members are 
inferior officers . . . .”). 
 148. Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing, as a “conservative esti-
mate,” that the majority’s opinion could jeopardize the job security of 573 high-
ranking civil service officials). 
 149. Id. at 538. The Court suggests, but does not definitively decide, that the 
opinion does not apply broadly to members of the civil service. Id. at 506 (ma-
jority opinion). 
 150. Id. at 507 n.10. 
 151. Id. 
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to consider the specifics of an agency’s design and an officer’s 
functions to decide whether particular removal restrictions are 
constitutional. It does not render two levels of for-cause removal 
protection per se unconstitutional.152 
6. Administrative Adjudication and the Appointments Clause 
Administrative adjudicators present a special challenge in 
applying appointment and removal precedents. Many likely pos-
sess sufficient authority to be officers, but at-will removal by po-
litical superiors could threaten their decisional independence. 
ALJs have been the subject of several circuit splits in the 
last two decades. ALJs hold a statutorily-created position with a 
statutorily-defined set of duties.153 They preside over trial-like 
proceedings at the agency level and issue recommended disposi-
tions for review by the Agency.154 Statutes typically empower 
agencies to appoint their own ALJs.155 Some courts held that 
ALJs are mere employees because they lack the authority to ren-
der final decisions.156 Others rejected the “final decision-making 
authority” requirement and held that ALJs are officers because 
their office is “established by law;” their “duties, salaries, and 
means of appointment” are set out in a statute; and they “exer-
cise significant discretion.”157 After the en banc D.C. Circuit di-
vided evenly on the question, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.158 
In Lucia v. SEC, the Court held that the SEC’s ALJs are 
officers.159 The Court relied primarily on Freytag: because the 
 
 152. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2391, 2392 (2011) (arguing that the Court decided Free Enterprise Fund 
based on the specific combination of officer functions at issue). But see Neomi 
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2541 (2011) (arguing that Free En-
terprise Fund “creates a framework for challenging the constitutionality of 
agency independence”). 
 153. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2017). 
 154. See id. § 556. 
 155. See, e.g., id. § 3105. 
 156. See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 157. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. de-
nied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). 
 158. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 159. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018). The SEC, acting collectively, 
is a head of department in which Congress has vested the appointment of ALJs. 
The SEC had impermissibly delegated that authority to other staff members. 
Id. at 2051 n.3. 
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ALJs at issue had almost all the material characteristics of STJs, 
they are officers.160 ALJs “hold a continuing office established by 
law.”161 They “take testimony,” “conduct trials,” “rule on the ad-
missibility of evidence,” and “have the power to enforce compli-
ance with discovery orders.”162 The Court found especially telling 
that the SEC could choose not to review an ALJ’s proposed order, 
in which case that order becomes final.163 This all added up to 
significant authority, and because the SEC staff had not consti-
tutionally appointed the ALJ that decided Lucia’s case, the 
Court remanded the case for a new hearing before a constitution-
ally-appointed—and different—ALJ.164 
Lucia is most notable for the questions it left unanswered. 
Because the Court resolved the case almost solely by analogy to 
Freytag, it offered no clarification on the meaning of the signifi-
cant authority standard.165 And notably, ALJs enjoy two166—and 
possibly even three167—layers of good-cause protection against 
their removal. At the certiorari stage, the Solicitor General 
asked the Court to address the constitutionality of these provi-
sions,168 and at the merits stage he urged the Court to “construe 
the statutory provision that addresses tenure protections for 
ALJs . . . to permit the removal of an ALJ for misconduct or fail-
ure to follow lawful agency directives or to perform his duties 
adequately.”169 This construction would seem, in effect, to allow 
termination for policy disagreements, which contradicts the tra-
ditional purpose of removal protections.170 The Court declined to 
 
 160. Id. at 2053–54. 
 161. Id. at 2052 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991)). 
 162. Id. at 2053 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82). 
 163. Id. at 2053–54. 
 164. Id. at 2052, 2055. By the time of the decision, the SEC had already 
taken unilateral action to cure the potential constitutional defect by ratifying 
the appointment of all ALJs and remanding pending cases for additional pro-
ceedings. See In re: Pending Admin. Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 82,178, Investment Advisers Act No. 4816, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 32,929, 34 SEC Docket 82,178 (Nov. 30, 
2017). 
 165. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2064–65 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 166. Brief for the Respondent at 20, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 17-
130 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 20–21. 
 169. Brief for the Respondent at 39, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 17-
130 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 170. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that 
for-cause removal protection did not allow the President to fire a Federal Trade 
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address the issue.171 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, 
would have resolved the case on statutory grounds: because the 
SEC had not appointed Lucia’s ALJ—as required by statute—
remand was appropriate.172 Deciding the constitutional question 
of ALJs’ officer status without deciding the “different, embedded 
constitutional question” posed by their removal protections 
risked undermining the independence of a whole class of career 
federal employees.173 
Lucia could have significant implications not just for the 
ALJs within the SEC or the approximately 1,500 other ALJs, but 
also for the approximately 3,300 administrative judges (AJs) 
that conduct informal adjudications in other agencies.174 AJs 
wield substantially similar power to ALJs and are even more 
common.175 Agencies frequently choose AJs over ALJs for 
greater flexibility and fewer procedural constraints, giving the 
agency greater control over the adjudicative process.176 CDP of-
ficers, as informal adjudicators, fall into the AJ category. And if 
CDP officers are inferior officers, their tenure protections may 
be subject to constitutional limitations. Lucia therefore could 
have major implications for the future independence of the IRS 
Office of Appeals. 
II.  CDP OFFICERS ARE LIKELY INFERIOR OFFICERS.   
In 2010 and 2012, respectively, the U.S. Tax Court and the 
D.C. Circuit held that CDP officers are not “Officers of the 
United States.”177 Those cases likely were wrongly decided. This 
Part recognizes that, because CDP officers “exercis[e] significant 
 
Commissioner for policy disagreements). But see PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 
75, 124 (2018) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that a for-
cause removal provision would allow the President to fire the official for ineffec-
tive policy choices). 
 171. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1 (2018). 
 172. Id. at 2058–59 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 173. Id. at 2057. 
 174. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1643, 1652 (2016). 
 175. Id. at 1647. 
 176. Id. at 1649. Kent Barnett criticizes this tendency, suggesting that it 
undermines impartiality and risks abuse in agency adjudications, which ac-
count for a greater and greater proportion of dispute resolutions each year. Id. 
at 1650–51. 
 177. Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 125 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
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authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,”178 they 
must be constitutional officers. But because of the degree of su-
pervision they face, they are inferior—rather than principal—
officers.179 This legal conclusion carries normative pros and cons: 
constitutional appointment could lend greater accountability to 
the hiring process and improve the quality of decisions, but it 
also jeopardizes CDP officer independence by placing their civil 
service protections under constitutional scrutiny. Part III ex-
plores those consequences in greater detail. 
A. TUCKER V. COMMISSIONER 
The first reported Appointments Clause challenge to CDP 
officers came in the U.S. Tax Court in 2010. In Tucker v. Com-
missioner (Tucker I), the Tax Court rejected that challenge.180 
The court traced the historical development of tax collection in 
the United States, noting a distinction between external revenue 
personnel—historically appointed by the President or by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury—and internal revenue personnel, who 
could be employed without an appointment.181 Because no spe-
cific statute governs the hiring or appointment of CDP officers, 
they are hired pursuant to the Commissioner’s general hiring 
authority.182 The court’s conclusion therefore depends on its im-
plicit assumption that the Commissioner is not a Head of De-
partment for Appointments Clause purposes.183 
The Tax Court held that CDP officers are not inferior offic-
ers but noted in dicta that, if they were officers, their appoint-
ment would be unconstitutional.184 Its conclusion was two-fold. 
First, the CDP officer position is not “established by law,” a 
threshold requirement for inferior officer status.185 The lack of 
any statute or regulation providing something like: “There shall 
be, within the Office of Appeals, officers designated as hearing 
officers, who shall conduct CDP hearings,” convinced the court 
that the law does not establish a CDP officer position.186 
 
 178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
 179. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (holding that 
inferior officers’ work must be “directed and supervised at some level”). 
 180. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 125. 
 181. Id. at 132–33. 
 182. Id. at 135 (citing I.R.C. § 7804(a) (2006)). 
 183. See id. at 126; see also supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 184. Id. at 134, 165. 
 185. Id. at 152. 
 186. Id. at 153. 
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Even if the position were established by law, the court held, 
CDP officers do not exercise the type of significant authority that 
warrants constitutional appointment.187 Relying heavily on the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Landry, the court held that CDP offic-
ers are not constitutional officers because their decisions “are not 
‘final’ in the sense that is relevant to the Appointments 
Clause.”188 The court also noted in dicta that CDP hearings lack 
the procedural formalities exercised under the Administrative 
Procedure Act by the ALJs in Landry.189 
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Tucker I, but on dif-
ferent reasoning.190 The court first noted that, while no statute 
or regulation established a CDP officer position “in any formal 
sense,” such a requirement “would seem anomalous” and could 
be inconsistent with the substance of the Appointments 
Clause.191 After casting doubt on this portion of the Tax Court’s 
opinion, the D.C. Circuit bypassed the issue. 
The D.C. Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s analysis of the sig-
nificant authority requirement. In contrast, it held that CDP of-
ficers’ decisions are effectively final, but that the supervision, 
guidelines, and consultation requirements to which CDP officers 
are subject left their discretion sufficiently constrained to pre-
clude officer status.192 It was this lack of discretion—not a lack 
of finality in decisions—that caused the Appointments Clause 
claim to fail.193 And while the court agreed with the Tax Court 
that the procedural informality of CDP hearings could be “a sig-
nal from Congress of the weightiness of the substantive powers 
granted,” it was not, in itself, a reason to deny officer status.194 
Tucker received limited scholarly attention. After the Tax 
Court’s decision and before the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance, Stacy 
M. Lindstedt published an article arguing that CDP officers are 
inferior officers under a newly-proposed Appointments Clause 
framework, based on principles of administrative finality.195 
John T. Plecnik disagreed in a 2014 article, arguing that the D.C. 
 
 187. Id. at 165. 
 188. See id. at 163–64. 
 189. Id. at 164–65. 
 190. Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 191. Id. at 1133. 
 192. Id. at 1134. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1135. 
 195. Lindstedt, supra note 30. 
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Circuit’s Tucker decision showed that the officer-employee dis-
tinction was “close to fully developed.”196 Neither article had the 
benefit of doctrinal developments in the last several years, and 
neither addressed the potential constitutional problem posed by 
CDP officers’ civil service protections. 
There is reason to believe that courts will reconsider the 
CDP issue at the circuit level soon. Litigants have brought Ap-
pointments Clause challenges in several cases pending before 
the Tax Court.197 New circuit decisions could create a split and 
lead to resolution by the Supreme Court. 
B. CURRENT LAW SHOWS TUCKER I AND TUCKER II WERE 
WRONGLY DECIDED. 
Lucia v. SEC calls into question the holdings in Tucker I and 
Tucker II. The Court in that case held that ALJs are “Officers of 
the United States” and not employees because: (1) they occupy 
“continuing” positions that are “established by law;” and (2) their 
statutory duties constitute “significant discretion.”198 Because 
CDP officers meet both prongs of the Lucia test, they are officers 
rather than employees. But because of the supervision they face 
from the IRS, they are inferior officers. 
1. CDP Officers Occupy Continuing Positions that Are 
Established by Law. 
CDP officers are full-time government workers. Both stat-
utes and regulations describe their duties and assume the posi-
tion already exists.199 But because no statute or regulation ex-
pressly creates the position of CDP officer, some might argue the 
position is not established by law and therefore need not comport 
 
 196. John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX 
REV. 201, 204 (2014). 
 197. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 1, Thompson v. 
Comm’r, No. 7038-15L (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not 
subject to the Appointments Clause); Petitioner Motion to Remand at 1, Elmes 
v. Comm’r, No. 24872-14L (T.C. Sept. 30, 2017) (arguing that CDP officers are 
subject to the Appointments Clause); Order at 1, Fonticiella v. Comm’r, No. 
23776-15L (T.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying petitioner’s motion for recusal on 
grounds that the President’s authority to remove Tax Court judges does not vi-
olate separation of powers principles). 
 198. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052–54 (2018) (quoting Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)). 
 199. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2017); Treas. Reg. § 6330-1 (2018). 
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with the Appointments Clause.200 While the Court in Lucia 
acknowledged that an officer’s position must be established by 
law, it has not equated “established by law” with “created by 
statute or regulation.”201 Doing so would create a doctrinal gap; 
Congress could evade the Appointments Clause by conferring 
duties—no matter how significant—collectively on the employ-
ees of a particular department.202 The Court has consistently fo-
cused on the continuing nature of the office and the significance 
of the office’s duties rather than the superficial aspects of its cre-
ation.203 An individual exercising the duties of an officer is an 
officer. Moreover, requiring that a statute prescribe an officer’s 
means of appointment comes close to the tautological reasoning 
of early Supreme Court cases on the issue (i.e., government 
workers are officers that must be appointed if they are, in fact, 
appointed).204 A more appropriate question to ask is whether the 
purported officer holds a continuing position and carries out sig-
nificant duties that the law requires someone to carry out.205 
That is clearly the case with CDP officers. 
2. CDP Officers Exercise Significant Authority. 
The Court in Lucia offered several factors that make the au-
thority ALJs exercise significant: ALJs “take testimony, conduct 
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power 
to enforce discovery orders.”206 In the course of these duties, they 
 
 200. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 152–59 (2010), aff ’d, 676 F.3d 1129 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that CDP officers do not hold a position “established 
by law”). 
 201. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (holding that the ALJ position is estab-
lished by law because it is created by statute, but not deciding whether statu-
tory creation is the exclusive means of establishing an office). 
 202. See Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133 (“[I]t would seem anomalous if the Ap-
pointments Clause were inapplicable to positions extant in the bureaucratic hi-
erarchy . . . merely because neither Congress nor the executive branch had for-
mally created the positions.”); see also Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1172–73 
(arguing that a formal requirement of statutory or regulatory creation is “sub-
ject to congressional manipulation”). 
 203. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (comparing the duties of ALJs to the duties 
of STJs). 
 204. See Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 115–17 (2007). 
 205. Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1177 (citing Officers of the U.S. Within the 
Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73 (2007)). 
 206. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. 
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“exercise significant discretion.”207 In at least some cases, they 
render final decisions.208  
To be sure, CDP officers’ duties do not line up “point for 
point” with those of the ALJs in Lucia or the STJs in Freytag,209 
but the similarities are nonetheless striking. CDP officers have 
significant discretion over how to conduct their proceedings, in-
cluding whether to allow the taxpayer to present witnesses.210 
They must consider all relevant information that the taxpayer 
presents on spousal defenses, the “appropriateness” of IRS col-
lection actions, and offers of collection alternatives.211 When the 
taxpayer has not previously had an opportunity to challenge the 
underlying tax liability, the officer may consider that as well.212 
It is difficult to see how this does not qualify as taking testimony 
in some sense. CDP officers issue a decision that is final if the 
taxpayer does not appeal to the Tax Court. If the taxpayer does 
appeal, the court reviews the determination under an abuse of 
discretion standard.213 
Moreover, the Court’s pre-Lucia Appointments Clause juris-
prudence remains intact, and the language it has used to de-
scribe officers in the past only reinforces the conclusion here. 
CDP officers almost certainly are “charged with ‘the administra-
tion and enforcement of the public law;’”214 they ensure that tax-
payers can exercise a statutorily created right within the tax col-
lection system. Early commentators recognized that those 
“connected with the administration of justice [and] the collection 
 
 207. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)). 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 2048 (“In a major Tax Court case, a regular Tax Court 
judge must always review an STJ’s opinion, and that opinion comes to nothing 
unless the regular judge adopts it. By contrast, the SEC can decide against re-
viewing an ALJ’s decision, and when it does so the ALJ’s decision itself ‘becomes 
final’ and is ‘deemed the action of the Commission.’” (quoting 17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.360(d)(2) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2015))). 
 209. See id. (comparing ALJs and STJs). 
 210. See Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1162. 
 211. Brief for Harvard Federal Tax Clinic as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Appellant at 6–7, Byers v. Comm’r, No. 17-2652 (8th Cir. Oct. 26, 2017) 
[hereinafter Harvard Brief ]  (quoting I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2017)). 
 212. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2017). 
 213. Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). 
 214. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
139 (1976)). 
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of the revenue” were some of the “most important civil offic-
ers.”215 When CDP officers issue a decision in the taxpayer’s fa-
vor, the decision is final.216 As full-time government employees 
carrying out statutorily defined duties, they can almost cer-
tainly, in some sense, “be said to hold an office.”217 Even superfi-
cially comparing CDP officers with others held to be officers in 
the past compels the conclusion that CDP officers fall within the 
term’s “unusually broad” sweep.218 It is difficult to see, for exam-
ple, how a district court clerk,219 a cadet engineer,220 and a “vice 
consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul,”221 would 
exercise significant authority while a CDP officer would not. 
There are two principal counterarguments. First, critics 
may point to the differences between the statutorily-defined du-
ties of ALJs and the more limited grant of authority to CDP of-
ficers. Congress provided a precise list of duties and powers for 
ALJs to exercise, while leaving much of CDP officers’ duties un-
defined.222 But a lack of statutory detail does not lessen the sig-
nificance of a CDP officers’ duties. Even when required to seek 
guidance or permission from elsewhere in the IRS, CDP officers 
have the power to make significant—and, at least occasionally, 
final—decisions about a taxpayer’s rights.223 Neither Freytag nor 
Lucia held that formal, adversarial procedures were a necessary 
or exclusive precondition of significant authority.224 
 
 215. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 89 (2007) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1530, at 387 (1833)). 
 216. Harvard Brief, supra note 211, at 25–26 (observing that only the tax-
payer, not the IRS, can appeal CDP determinations to the Tax Court). 
 217. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)). 
 218. Id.; see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (listing government workers previ-
ously held to be inferior officers). 
 219. See In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839). 
 220. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1886). 
 221. See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898). 
 222. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2017) (empowering ALJs as employees to 
exercise enumerated powers over formal, adversarial administrative proceed-
ings), with I.R.C. § 6330(c) (2017) (empowering CDP officers to preside at CDP 
hearings and issue a determination). 
 223. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 224. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e do 
not understand Freytag to suggest that mere informality of proceedings, or the 
absence of adversarial procedures, could justify denying ‘Officer’ status to one 
whose powers would otherwise demand that classification.” (citations omitted)); 
cf. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051–52 (2018) (stating that the similarity 
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Second, critics may argue that CDP officers do not exercise 
significant discretion. The D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion 
in Tucker II,225 and the IRS continues to advance this argument 
in ongoing litigation.226 It is true that CDP officers must follow 
Agency guidance and must seek legal advice on novel ques-
tions.227 But while courts have generally accepted that officers 
must exercise some degree of discretion, institutional con-
straints on discretion are a form of supervision that is more rel-
evant to the principal/inferior distinction than to the officer/em-
ployee distinction.228 CDP officers have the discretion either to 
determine that a given collection action is appropriate or to ac-
cept a taxpayer’s offer-in-compromise, binding the IRS in the 
process.229 That discretion is surely sufficient to make them of-
ficers. 
3. CDP Officers Are Inferior—Rather than Principal—
Officers. 
The institutional constraints that the IRS places on CDP of-
ficers likely makes them inferior officers. An inferior officer is 
one “whose work is directed or supervised at some level by others 
who were appointed by the presidential nomination with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.”230 In Edmond, judges on the 
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were subject to the ad-
ministrative oversight of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), 
who was in turn subordinate to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion.231 The JAG would “prescribe uniform rules of procedure” 
and meet with other Judge Advocates General to “formulate pol-
icies and procedure.”232 Even so, the JAG could not reverse the 
judges’ decisions or use the threat of removal to influence those 
decisions.233 
 
between ALJs and STJs made it unnecessary to elaborate on the significant 
authority standard). 
 225. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. 
 226. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 38–40, Thompson 
v. Comm’r, No. 7038-15 (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not 
officers because they lack sufficient discretion). 
 227. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing ways in which agency guidance con-
strains CDP officer discretion). 
 228. See Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 303 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 229. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 230. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
 231. Id. at 664–65. 
 232. Id. at 664. 
 233. Id. at 665. 
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Like the judges in Edmond, CDP officers must follow the 
policies and procedures in the Internal Revenue Manual and 
must often abide by the technical advice they receive from the 
IRS General Counsel on novel or complex questions.234 They oc-
casionally must seek permission to accept an offer-in-compro-
mise.235 Still, the IRS may not reverse or appeal a CDP officer’s 
decision.236 So while CDP officers’ discretion in decision-making 
is constrained, their relationship to their superiors fits squarely 
within Edmond’s subordination test. Subject to agency guidance 
and deferential review by the Tax Court, CDP officers exercise 
substantial discretion over the fate of the taxpayers that appear 
before them. 
*** 
While lower courts have attempted to impose more restric-
tive tests on the Appointments Clause, that approach is incon-
sistent with the vague and “unusually broad” definition of infe-
rior officer that characterizes Supreme Court jurisprudence.237 
It seems difficult to deny that CDP officers are inferior officers. 
The more interesting questions are what to do about it and what 
it means for their civil service protections. Does the chance that 
those protections violate the Constitution jeopardize the adjudi-
catory independence of CDP officers? This constitutional head-
ache might lead some to pause before concluding that CDP offic-
ers are inferior officers. But that is inconsistent with the 
formalism that characterizes the Supreme Court’s inferior of-
ficer precedent.238 By contrast, its removal precedent, discussed 
above, requires an examination of an agency’s design and an of-
ficer’s functions—and the relationship of removal protections to 
those functions—to make a constitutional determination.239 
III.  CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BUT SHOULD KEEP 
THEIR CIVIL SERVICE PROTECTIONS.   
The conclusion that CDP officers are inferior officers creates 
a potential constitutional mess. Who should appoint them? What 
happens with previously decided cases and those that are still 
 
 234. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 64. 
 236. See supra note 64. 
 237. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 238. Id. (describing the broad sweep of the definition of officer). 
 239. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
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pending? And perhaps most consequential: are CDP officers’ civil 
service protections constitutional? 
Section A recommends that Congress vest the appointment 
of CDP officers in the Secretary of the Treasury. Section B briefly 
outlines remedies the Court can use to give the Agency a man-
ageable logistical burden for constitutional compliance. Sections 
C and D conclude that CDP officers should keep their civil ser-
vice protections because their adjudicative role justifies the in-
dependence those protections promote. 
A. CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY 
OF THE TREASURY. 
First and foremost, as inferior officers, CDP officers must be 
appointed. Congress can vest their appointment in the Presi-
dent, the Head of a Department, or the Courts of Law.240 The 
best option is the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue likely cannot con-
tinue simply to hire CDP officers because the Commissioner is 
not a constitutional Head of Department. What exactly consti-
tutes a Department for purposes of the Appointments Clause is 
not entirely clear; while it may not need to be a cabinet-level de-
partment,241 it does not encompass “every organ in the Executive 
Branch.”242 Because the IRS falls under the umbrella of the 
Treasury Department, it is likely not a Department, so the Com-
missioner is not a constitutional Head of Department.243 And 
even if the Commissioner could be construed as a Head of De-
partment, vesting the selection of CDP officers in the Commis-
sioner may not be consistent with the impartial, detached rela-
tionship those officers are meant to hold with the collection 
process of the Agency.244 If CDP officers are chosen by the indi-
vidual that oversees the IRS—rather than by the IRS itself—
they may feel less pressure to side with their direct superiors. 
 
 240. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. This Note concludes that presidential ap-
pointment of CDP officers, with or without Senate confirmation, is both imprac-
ticable and unnecessary. 
 241. But see Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991) (confining the term 
Departments “to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments”). 
 242. Id. at 885. 
 243. Id. Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, would have held that “all 
independent executive establishments [are Departments].” Id. at 919 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
 244. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that CDP officers be impartial); 
IRM § 8.1.10 (Sept. 28, 2017) (restricting ex parte communications between 
CDP officers and other IRS functions). 
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Allowing the appointment of CDP officers by the Secretary 
of the Treasury addresses both issues. The Secretary is undoubt-
edly a Head of Department for purposes of the Appointments 
Clause.245 The Secretary is a presidentially-appointed and Sen-
ate-confirmed officer246 who is removable at will by the Presi-
dent, making him or her accountable for the quality of appoint-
ments. Vesting appointment in the Secretary can minimize the 
procedural burden of presidential appointment and Senate con-
firmation247 while capitalizing on the Secretary’s likely expertise 
concerning the proper qualifications for revenue officers. This 
would certainly represent an increase in the number of appoin-
tees each year, but it would be a comparative drop in the 
bucket.248 Indeed, granting the Secretary this appointment 
power would likely be the quickest and least disruptive route to 
constitutional compliance. Moreover, placing the responsibility 
for appointments with the Head of Treasury may lessen the 
risk—whether actual or perceived—that CDP officers hired by 
the IRS will be biased in favor of the Agency. 
Appointment by a court of law might seem an appropriate 
choice, given CDP officers’ adjudicative role and the requirement 
that they be impartial,249 but that option creates its own consti-
tutional complications. While the Court has upheld interbranch 
appointments in the past,250 the extent to which they are permit-
ted is unclear.251 Some commentators have argued that the text 
of the Appointments Clause only allows Courts of Law to appoint 
their own inferior officers—clerks, for example.252 Moreover, 
judges cannot be removed at will or voted out of office; even if, as 
 
 245. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (differentiating between a secretary and 
an inferior officer). 
 246. See 31 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2017). 
 247. See Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1186–87 (describing the logistical and 
political advantages of appointment by heads of departments). 
 248. See id. (noting that the government had been able to manage “the an-
nual appointment of roughly 240,000 military officers in the past”). 
 249. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017). 
 250. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673–76 (1988) (upholding the 
appointment of an independent counsel by a special Article III court). 
 251. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding that Con-
gress could not retain the power to remove the Comptroller General), with Mis-
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 252. Jennifer L. Mascott, Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication, 
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discussed below, adjudicatory independence justifies some insu-
lation from removal once a CDP officer is in office, appointment 
by an executive branch official can ensure some level of prospec-
tive accountability for the quality of appointments. Appointment 
by a court would be inconsistent with this purpose of the Clause. 
Appointment by the President, with or without confirmation 
by the Senate, is both unnecessary and impractical. The large 
number of CDP officers253 would further clog an already ham-
pered presidential nomination process.254 Moreover, inferior of-
ficers are typically appointed by principal officers that supervise 
them.255 Here, it makes sense for the Secretary, who theoreti-
cally possesses more specific expertise than the President in the 
needs of the tax system, to choose the people that carry out the 
Agency’s rules and directives. 
Congress and the IRS need not wade into these constitu-
tional and logistical complexities to solve the problem at hand. 
Providing for appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury is 
the quickest and cleanest—albeit a slightly formalistic—way to 
resolve the constitutional issue, and as discussed in Section D 
below, it strikes the best balance between independence and ac-
countability. 
B. A HOLDING THAT CDP OFFICERS ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS 
NEED NOT INVALIDATE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED CASES. 
If CDP officers have not been constitutionally appointed to 
date, what happens to the many thousands of decisions they 
have already issued or to currently pending cases? This concern 
has come up in the ALJ cases that led to Lucia.256 There is reason 
to believe the Court would fashion a remedy to minimize the bu-
reaucratic chaos. 
 
 253. At the end of FY2017 there were 857 CDP officers. Table 30: Personnel 
Summary, by Employment Status, Budget Activity, and Selected Personnel 
Type, Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs 
.gov/statistics/irs-budget-and-workforce (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 254. Cf. Sheldon Goldman, Tracking Obstruction and Delay in U.S. Senate 
Confirmations of Judges to the Federal Courts, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK 
(July 1, 2013), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/tracking 
-obstruction-and-delay-us-senate-confirmations-judges-federal-courts (discuss-
ing how the nomination process is known for its logistical and political delays). 
 255. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (“[T]here shall 
be in the said department, an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said prin-
cipal officer . . . .” (quoting Act of 27 July 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28 (1789))). 
 256. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1201 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (“Today’s holding risks throw-
ing much into disarray.”). 
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In the past, the Court has applied remedial-mitigation doc-
trines to retroactively validate actions taken by “entire adminis-
trative or legislative bodies.”257 After the Supreme Court found 
in Buckley v. Valeo that the FEC’s structure violated the Ap-
pointments Clause, it granted all of the agency’s past acts “de 
facto validity.”258 It also issued a thirty-day stay on its judgment 
in order to give Congress time to reconstitute the Agency.259 As 
authority for this remedy, the Court cited precedent according 
“de facto validity” to the acts of legislators elected pursuant to 
unconstitutional apportionment plans.260 In a later case, the 
Court limited the de facto validity doctrine to cases involving 
election law or challenges to an entire agency design.261 But the 
Court applied a similar retroactive remedy when it found that 
bankruptcy courts violated Article III in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.262 The Court noted that 
retroactive application would “not further the operation of [the] 
holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice upon those 
litigants who relied upon . . . the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
courts.”263 Whether or not the Court refers to the remedy in a 
potential future CDP case as “de facto validity,” it is likely to opt 
for a remedy it considers minimal and pragmatic.264 
Mitigation is appropriate in the CDP case. Given the sheer 
number of CDP cases resolved each year,265 reopening previously 
closed cases would be entirely impracticable. Reexamining these 
cases would delay implementation of a constitutional CDP pro-
cess and could “visit substantial injustice” on taxpayers that re-
lied on the past actions of the Office of Appeals. Just as it did in 
Buckley, a temporary stay could allow Congress to address the 
situation. 
Professor Kent Barnett argues that these remedial-mitiga-
tion doctrines do not provide adequate redress for violations of 
 
 257. Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Par-
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 261. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–84. 
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aration of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 682 (2016). 
 263. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88. 
 264. See Kent Barnett, The Consequences of Missing Appointments, YALE J. 
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 2, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the 
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 265. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
  
420 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:385 
 
challenging parties’ constitutional rights.266 He has a point; if 
the Court has granted an unconstitutional agency action de facto 
validity, the challenging party is left out in the cold with only a 
pyrrhic victory.267 The Court could address this concern by 
granting validity only to closed cases while requiring a new CDP 
hearing before a properly appointed officer—and perhaps a dif-
ferent officer than before—in still-pending cases.268 The SEC 
tried to do this unilaterally by ratifying ALJ appointments and 
ordering new proceedings in light of the uncertainty created by 
Lucia.269 In any case, a full assessment of the appropriate rem-
edy is beyond the scope of this Note. For present purposes, it is 
enough to note the precedent for remedies that fix constitutional 
violations without creating an insurmountable logistical burden 
for agencies. 
C. CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THEIR CIVIL 
SERVICE PROTECTIONS. 
Holding that CDP officers are inferior officers and prescrib-
ing appointment by the Secretary does not end the discussion. 
Restrictions on an inferior officer’s removal that improperly in-
terfere with the President’s power to control the execution of the 
laws are unconstitutional.270 But the removal protections that 
CDP officers enjoy do not—and should not—run afoul of Free En-
terprise Fund. 
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court noted that the two levels 
of protection PCAOB members enjoyed were an unconstitutional 
limitation on the President’s power to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed.271 The Court noted, however, that the exec-
utive nature of the PCAOB’s functions supported its decision.272 
 
 266. Barnett, supra note 262, at 683; see also Kristin E. Hickman, Symbol-
ism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 
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equately protect the rights of challenging parties). 
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 268. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055–56 (2018) (remanding for a new 
hearing before a different ALJ than before). 
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It contrasted PCAOB members with ALJs, who “perform adjudi-
cative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions.”273 It 
is thus a fair reading of the case that the nature of an officer’s 
functions help determine the constitutionality of a given removal 
scheme.274 Dual-layer good-cause removal protections are not 
per se unconstitutional; rather, it is a nuanced question of officer 
functions and agency design.275 
The Court did not clarify the scope of Free Enterprise Fund 
in Lucia, and it is unclear where the decisions will lead. The SEC 
may remove an ALJ only for good cause as determined by the 
MSPB. Members of the MSPB themselves are only removable by 
the President for good cause shown. If, as the majority in Free 
Enterprise Fund assumed, members of the SEC are removable 
by the President only for good cause, then the SEC’s ALJs enjoy 
three layers of removal protections. After the Court declined the 
opportunity to weigh in on these protections in Lucia, the White 
House took matters into its own hands, purporting by executive 
order to strip ALJs of their good-cause protection.276 
ALJs’ removal protections are distinguishable from those at 
issue in Free Enterprise Fund. ALJs carry out primarily adjudi-
cative, rather than policymaking, functions. While an agency’s 
decision to bring proceedings before an ALJ could certainly be 
characterized as policymaking,277 the ALJ is meant to play an 
impartial, adjudicative role in those proceedings.278 The Court 
left itself an out in Free Enterprise Fund; it can, and should, hold 
that the removal protections enjoyed by ALJs are both constitu-
tional and consistent with precedent.279 
But no matter what the Court may do in a future ALJ case, 
CDP officers should be able to keep their civil service protections 
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notwithstanding their officer status. CDP officers play an im-
portant role in the tax collection process, but that role is adjudi-
cative. The CDP program was enacted out of concern for the due 
process rights of taxpayers,280 and the statute contemplates im-
partiality on the part of the appeals officer conducting a hear-
ing.281 As described above, CDP officers exercise discretion and 
judgment when deciding the appropriateness of collection ac-
tions.282 They receive factual information both from the IRS and 
from the taxpayer and apply the law to those facts. 
Even if ALJs’ removal protections are unconstitutional, 
CDP officers are distinguishable. Because the Secretary of the 
Treasury is removable by the President at will, there is no argu-
ment that CDP officers would enjoy three layers of removal pro-
tection. The majority in Free Enterprise Fund clearly implied 
that two levels of good-cause protection could be permissible for 
adjudicative officers. CDP officers are constitutionally secure.283 
D. A PROPER APPOINTMENT, COMBINED WITH EXISTING CIVIL 
SERVICE PROTECTIONS, STRIKES THE APPROPRIATE NORMATIVE 
BALANCE BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY. 
Providing for appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury 
while maintaining civil service protections is constitutionally 
permissible, and it also makes normative sense. The majority in 
Free Enterprise Fund was correct to note the meaningful differ-
ence between policymaking and adjudicative functions. Adjudi-
cation warrants more independence. 
The present CDP scheme has normative flaws in addition to 
its constitutional violation. Civil service insulation without the 
accountability of a constitutional appointment reduces the in-
centive to make careful and high-quality decisions.284 The Secre-
 
 280. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998) (“The Committee believes that follow-
ing procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in collections will in-
crease fairness to taxpayers.”). 
 281. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017). 
 282. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 283. Even if a court were to find these two layers of good-cause protection 
unconstitutional, courts could craft a remedy that does not cause the civil ser-
vice to implode. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1190 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Briscoe, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). Just as the Court 
in Free Enterprise Fund simply severed the PCAOB’s good-cause removal pro-
vision and made PCAOB members removable by the SEC at will, courts could 
hold that members of the MSPB are removable at will by the President. Id. at 
1190–91. 
 284. See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW OF 
  
2018] LATE FOR AN APPOINTMENT 423 
 
tary, and the President that appoints the Secretary, must be pro-
spectively accountable for the smooth and effective operation of 
the CDP program. Delegating the hiring of CDP officers to the 
Commissioner, the head of Appeals, or a human resources office 
dilutes that accountability and deprives the public of a clear tar-
get for its dissatisfaction.285 
Invalidating the civil service protections as applied to CDP 
officers would present its own problems. Giving a presidential 
political appointee an absolute right of removal would strip CDP 
officers of any semblance of the impartiality their governing stat-
ute requires.286 At-will removal would invite bias in favor of the 
agency and reduced public faith in the tax system.287 In the con-
text of an adjudication, such a scenario could even rise to the 
level of a due process violation.288 
This Note’s solution recognizes that all government actors 
fall on a spectrum between total political accountability and to-
tal independence.289 Ideally, elected officials will fall close to the 
politically accountable end, while Article III judges, with their 
lifetime salaries and tenure, will come as close as possible to to-
tal independence. Agency actors fall somewhere in between, de-
pending on a variety of factors, including: whether the agency is 
independent or a part of the executive branch; the extent to 
which the officer engages in policymaking; and whether the of-
ficer engages in rulemaking or adjudication. Appointment mech-
anisms and removal restrictions help calibrate where a particu-
lar officer or agency falls on the spectrum. 
Naturally, policymakers and neutral adjudicators will fall at 
different points. Of course, not all agency adjudications are the 
same. Different forms of adjudication involve different degrees 
of policymaking, and agencies typically may choose to set policy 
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through either rulemaking or adjudication.290 But some posi-
tions fall clearly in the neutral adjudication category; a CDP of-
ficer—whose job is to evaluate the appropriateness of a specific 
collection action in a specific case according to established 
rules—is one of them. While both adjudicators and policymakers 
can be inferior officers that require constitutional appointment, 
the Constitution does not require a one-size-fits-all approach to 
their removal. It tolerates more independence for adjudica-
tors.291 
Appointing CDP officers while allowing them to maintain 
civil service protections strikes the right constitutional and nor-
mative balance. It acknowledges that the significant authority 
they exercise warrants their designation as officers of the United 
States, but it recognizes that the Internal Revenue Code, due 
process, and common sense require from them a certain degree 
of independence. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Appointments Clause contemplates a balance between 
political accountability, independence, and effective administra-
tion of the laws. There is perhaps no area in which it is more 
important to strike that balance than in tax administration. 
This Note explores how the Appointments Clause developed 
and how it has evolved (or failed to evolve) to accommodate a 
government that is much bigger and more complex than the 
Founders likely ever contemplated. Despite efforts by lower 
courts to cabin the Clause’s applicability, Supreme Court prece-
dent suggests that the provision casts a wide net that captures 
the IRS’s CDP officers. CDP officers need to be appointed, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury is the one to do it. Congress should 
codify this change to achieve constitutional compliance while 
minimizing the disruption that such procedural changes can 
cause. 
But the constitutional problem ends there. CDP officers’ role 
as adjudicators justifies civil service protections to prevent arbi-
trary removal and to protect their statutorily-mandated impar-
tiality. These restrictions do not improperly interfere with the 
President’s control over the administration of the laws, and 
there is room for them within the contours of the Constitution. 
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